Abstract
Persistent_BNDC (P_BNDC, for short) is an information-flow security property for processes in dynamic contexts, i.e., contexts that can be reconfigured at runtime. Intuitively, P_BNDC requires that high level interactions never interfere with the low level behavior of the system, in every possible state. P_BNDC is verified by checking whether the system interacting with a high level component is bisimilar or not to the system in isolation. In this work we contribute to the verification of information-flow security in two respects: (i) we give an unwinding condition that allows us to express P_BNDC in terms of a local property on high level actions and (ii) we exploit this local property in order to define a proof system which provides a very efficient technique for the development and the verification of P_BNDC processes.
This work has been partially supported by the MURST project “Modelli formali per la sicurezza” and the EU Contract IST-2001-32617 “Models and Types for Security in Mobile Distributed Systems” (MyThS).
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Bossi, A., Focardi, R., Piazza, C., Rossi, S. (2003). A Proof System for Information Flow Security. In: Leuschel, M. (eds) Logic Based Program Synthesis and Transformation. LOPSTR 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2664. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45013-0_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45013-0_16
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