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Multilevel Security and Quality of Protection

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Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 23))

Abstract

Constraining how information may flow within a system is at the heart of many protection mechanisms and many security policies have direct interpretations in terms of information flow and multilevel security style controls. However, while conceptually simple, multilevel security controls have been difficult to achieve in practice. In this paper we explore how the traditional assurance measures that are used in the network multilevel security model can be re-interpreted and generalised to provide the basis of a framework for reasoning about the quality of protection provided by a secure system configuration.

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Foley, S.N., Bistarelli, S., O’Sullivan, B., Herbert, J., Swart, G. (2006). Multilevel Security and Quality of Protection. In: Gollmann, D., Massacci, F., Yautsiukhin, A. (eds) Quality of Protection. Advances in Information Security, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-29016-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-36584-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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