Skip to main content

Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum Blockchain: A Quantitative Analysis

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST 2022)

Abstract

A blockchain is an immutable ledger driven by a distributed consensus protocol. In public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum consensus is established through a computational effort called Proof-of-Work (PoW). Special users called miners contribute to the PoW computational effort in exchange for a fee and also verify the data stored in blocks mined by the other miners. Here is where the Verifier’s Dilemma emerges. To maximise their profits, miners are incentivized to invest their resources in PoW, because they do not receive any incentives for the verification phase. In this paper, we study the Verifier’s Dilemma using a quantitative model based on PEPA. The analysis demonstrates the circumstances under which non-verifying miners gain fees higher than that of verifying miners. Moreover, we consider a mitigation approach consisting of the injection of invalid blocks to disturb the mining process of non-verifying miners. The model allows us to derive the optimal rate at which invalid blocks must be injected, so that skipping the verifying phase becomes economically disadvantageous while the throughput of the blockchain is only minimally reduced. The impact on miners’ rewards and overall performance is also assessed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Alharby, M., Lunardi, R.C., Aldweesh, A., van Moorsel, A.: Data-driven model-based analysis of the ethereum verifier’s Dilemma. In: 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), pp. 209–220. IEEE (2020)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Alzetta, G., Marin, A., Piazza, C., Rossi, S.: Lumping-based equivalences in Markovian automata: algorithms and applications to product-form analyses. Inf. Comput. 260, 99–125 (2018)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Anjana, P.S., Kumari, S., Peri, S., Rathor, S., Somani, A.: An efficient framework for optimistic concurrent execution of smart contracts. In: 2019 27th Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP), pp. 83–92. IEEE (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Balsamo, S., Marin, A., Mitrani, I., Rebagliati, N.: Prediction of the consolidation delay in blockchain-based applications. In: ICPE 2021: ACM/SPEC International Conference on Performance Engineering, Virtual Event, France, 19–21 April 2021, pp. 81–92 (2021)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Buterin, V., et al.: Ethereum: A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Das, S., Awathare, N., Ren, L., Ribeiro, V.J., Bellur, U.: Tuxedo: maximizing smart contract computation in PoW blockchains. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 5(3), 1–30 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Das, S., Ribeiro, V.J., Anand, A.: YODA: Enabling computationally intensive contracts on blockchains with byzantine and selfish nodes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03265 (2018)

  8. Dickerson, T., Gazzillo, P., Herlihy, M., Koskinen, E.: Adding concurrency to smart contracts. Distrib. Comput. 33(3), 209–225 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-019-00357-z

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Fiz Pontiveros, B.B., Ferreira Torres, C., State, R.: Sluggish mining: profiting from the verifier’s dilemma. In: Bracciali, A., Clark, J., Pintore, F., Rønne, P.B., Sala, M. (eds.) FC 2019. LNCS, vol. 11599, pp. 67–81. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_6

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Hillston, J.: A Compositional Approach to Performance Modelling. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Kalodner, H., Goldfeder, S., Chen, X., Weinberg, S.M., Felten, E.W.: Arbitrum: scalable, private smart contracts. In: 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), pp. 1353–1370 (2018)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Luu, L., Teutsch, J., Kulkarni, R., Saxena, P.: Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 706–719 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Marin, A., Rossi, S.: On the relations between lumpability and reversibility. In: MASCOTS, pp. 427–432. IEEE Computer Society (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Marin, A., Rossi, S.: On the relations between Markov chain lumpability and reversibility. Acta Informatica 54(5), 447–485 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00236-016-0266-1

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Olver, F.W.J., Lozier, D.W., Boisvert, R.F., Clark, C.W.: The NIST Handbook of Mathematical Functions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2010)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Teutsch, J., Reitwießner, C.: A scalable verification solution for blockchains. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.04756 (2019)

  17. Yu, L., Tsai, W.T., Li, G., Yao, Y., Hu, C., Deng, E.: Smart-contract execution with concurrent block building. In: 2017 IEEE Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering (SOSE), pp. 160–167. IEEE (2017)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This work has been partially supported by the Project PRIN 2020 “Nirvana - Noninterference and Reversibility Analysis in Private Blockchains” - N. 20202FCJMH and by the Project GNCS 2022 “Proprietà qualitative e quantitative di sistemi reversibili”.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sabina Rossi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendices

Appendix

A Tables of Notations

The following tables provide a description of the notations used in the PEPA specification of the BM and IBIM models. In particular they describe the notations used to model the behaviours of single fair and unfair miners and those used for the environments.

Table 7. BM component description.
Table 8. IBIM component description.

B Steady State Probabilities for BM

We report the symbolic expressions of the steady-state probabilities for the BM model. In particular, the steady-state probabilities for the CTMC depicted in Fig. 2 are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi _1= & {} \frac{(\beta ^2 (2 (\beta + \gamma + \lambda ) - \lambda p))}{K}\\ \pi _2= & {} \frac{(\beta ((\gamma + \lambda ) (2 \gamma + \lambda ) + \beta (3 \gamma + \lambda )))}{K}\\ \pi _3= & {} \frac{(\beta (\beta (\gamma + \lambda ) + (2 \gamma + \lambda ) (\gamma + \lambda - \lambda p)))}{K}\\ \pi _4= & {} \frac{((\beta + \gamma + \lambda ) (\beta (\gamma + \lambda ) + (2\gamma + \lambda ) (\gamma + \lambda - \lambda p)))}{K} \end{aligned}$$

where \(\sum _{i=1}^4\pi _i=1\) and K is the normalising constant whose expression is

$$\begin{aligned}&K=(2 \beta ^3 + \beta ^2 (7 \gamma - \lambda (-5 + p)) + \beta (7 \gamma ^2 + \gamma \lambda (11 - 4 p) -\\&\qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \quad \;\; - 2 \lambda ^2 (-2 + p)) + (\gamma + \lambda ) (2 \gamma + \lambda )(\gamma + \lambda - \lambda p))\,. \end{aligned}$$

C Steady-State Probabilities for IBIM

We report the symbolic expressions of the steady-state probabilities for the IBIM model. In particular, the steady-state probabilities for the CTMC depicted in Fig. 5 are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi _1= & {} \frac{\beta ^2 \left( \lambda ^3 r^2 \left( -2 \beta ^2 (r-2)-\beta \varepsilon (r-2)\right) +\lambda ^2 r \left( 3 \beta ^2 \varepsilon (r+2)+2 \beta ^3 (r+2)\right. \right. }{K}\\[2mm]&\qquad \frac{\left. \left. +\beta \varepsilon ^2 (r+2)\right) +\lambda r (\beta +\varepsilon ) \left( 6 \beta ^2 \varepsilon +4 \beta ^3+2 \beta \varepsilon ^2\right) \right) }{K}\\[2mm] \pi _2= & {} \frac{\beta \left( \beta ^2 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) \left( 4 \varepsilon ^2+3 \varepsilon \lambda (r+1)+2 \lambda ^2 r\right) +2 \beta ^4 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda )+\right. }{K}\\[2mm]&\qquad \frac{\left. +\beta ^3 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (5 \varepsilon +2 \lambda (r+1))+\beta \varepsilon \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda )^2 (\varepsilon +\lambda r)\right) }{K}\\[2mm] \pi _3= & {} \frac{\beta (\beta +\varepsilon +\lambda ) \left( 2 \beta ^3 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda )+\beta ^2 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (5 \varepsilon +2 \lambda )\right. }{K}\\[2mm]&\qquad \frac{\left. +\beta \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) \left( 4 \varepsilon ^2+3 \varepsilon \lambda -2 \lambda ^2 (r-1) r\right) +\varepsilon \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (\varepsilon +\lambda -\lambda r) (\varepsilon +\lambda r)\right) }{K}\\[2mm] \pi _4= & {} \frac{\beta ^2 \left( 2 \beta ^3 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda )+\beta ^2 \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (5 \varepsilon +2 \lambda )\right. }{K}\\[2mm]&\qquad \frac{\left. +\beta \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) \left( 4 \varepsilon ^2+3 \varepsilon \lambda -2 \lambda ^2 (r-1) r\right) +\varepsilon \lambda r (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (\varepsilon +\lambda -\lambda r) (\varepsilon +\lambda r)\right) }{K} \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} \pi _5= & {} \frac{\beta ^2 \varepsilon (2 \beta +2 \varepsilon +\lambda r)}{(\beta +\varepsilon ) (2 \beta +\varepsilon ) (\varepsilon +\lambda r) (\beta +\varepsilon +\lambda r)}\\[2mm] \pi _6= & {} \frac{\beta \varepsilon }{(\beta +\varepsilon ) (2 \beta +\varepsilon )}\\[2mm] \pi _7= & {} \frac{\varepsilon }{2 \beta +\varepsilon }\\[2mm] \pi _8= & {} \frac{\beta \varepsilon }{(2 \beta +\varepsilon ) (\beta +\varepsilon +\lambda r)}\\ \end{aligned}$$

where \(\sum _{i=1}^8\pi _i=1\) and K is

$$\begin{aligned}&K=(\beta +\varepsilon ) (2 \beta +\varepsilon ) (\varepsilon +\lambda r) (\beta +\varepsilon +\lambda r) \left( 2 \beta ^3+\beta ^2 (5 \varepsilon +5 \lambda -\lambda r)\right. \\&\qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \qquad \left. + \, 2 \beta (\varepsilon +\lambda ) (2 \varepsilon +2 \lambda -\lambda r)+(\varepsilon +\lambda )^2 (\varepsilon +\lambda -\lambda r)\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Smuseva, D., Malakhov, I., Marin, A., van Moorsel, A., Rossi, S. (2022). Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum Blockchain: A Quantitative Analysis. In: Ábrahám, E., Paolieri, M. (eds) Quantitative Evaluation of Systems. QEST 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13479. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16336-4_16

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16336-4_16

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-16335-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-16336-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics