Abstract
In 2002 the African Union (AU) definitely succeeded to the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU). The new Pan-African organisation soon proceeded towards the institution of a regional security system, made up of several organs and mechanisms and enabled to deploy operative actions. Nowadays the full realisation of the African security system primarily relies on the availability of the necessary financial resources. It is well-known that the great majority of the African States is economically weak. Therefore, some international donors usually give financial assistance. As a result, the budgetary dependence from abroad is one of the main problems currently affecting the African security system. The quest for regional autonomy in peace maintenance, which the African States pursue, further stresses the said problem. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part begins with a focus on the historical and political reasons that led to the establishment of the African security system. Then, it highlights the quest for autonomy emerging both from the legal frame and from the complex web of the organs and mechanisms of the regional security system. The second part of the chapter shows that the funding of the regional security system mainly depends on the international donors. The financial support above all comes from the EU, the UN, some NGOs, single non-African States and other private actors. The UN also carries out an important role in the deployment of the AU operative actions.
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Notes
- 1.
The Addis Ababa Charter is available at www.au.int, as well as every other legal document that I will mention hereinafter, if another source is not indicated.
- 2.
- 3.
The Lomé Act itself does not directly provide the organs and mechanisms of the regional security system maybe because of the ‘haste with which the drafters had to meet the impatient deadlines set by Libya’: see Cilliers (2001), p. 108.
- 4.
See Mays (2003), p. 107 et seq; Majinge (2010), p. 469 et seq and p. 490 et seq; Cellamare (2015a), p. 40. See also the statement of the former Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, at the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa in July 2012, according to whom ‘the solutions to African problems are found on the Continent and nowhere else’.
- 5.
- 6.
Therefore, the AU does not seemingly accept the well-known qualification of ‘decentralised organ of the UN’ proposed for the regional organisations by Quadri (1968), p. 373 et seq.
- 7.
- 8.
The African States also realised that the difficulties posed to Africa’s economic development largely depended on the many conflicts raging on the Continent.
- 9.
Almost all the African States belong to the AEC, the only exceptions being Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Morocco, Somalia and South Sudan. The AEC, born with the Abuja Treaty in 1991, is nowadays linked to the AU. Its objective is to foster the development of economic and trade stronger relationships among the African States, with the final aim to create an economic and monetary union, on the model of the EU. For this purpose, the AEC promotes the sub-regional economic cooperation: Article 88 of the Abuja Treaty provides the creation of the RECs as ‘pillars’ of the AEC. Many RECs are directly connected to the AEC through a Protocol entered into force in 1998. Some of them cooperate with the AU also in the management of the regional security system, on the basis of the Memorandum of Understandings stipulated in 1998.
- 10.
See AHG/OAU/Decl. 3 (XXIX). On the Cairo Mechanism, see Gutto (1996), p. 314 et seq.
- 11.
See AHG/OAU/Dec. 160 (XXXVII).
- 12.
See AHG/AU/Dec. 2 (I).
- 13.
- 14.
Article 3 of the Lomé Act lists all the objectives of the AU. In particular, Article 3.f provides the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
- 15.
See Article 4.d.
- 16.
See Article 4.h. According to some authors, this provision would represent the codification in the African context of the controversial doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’. On the topic, see Aning and Atuobi (2009), p. 90 et seq More extensively, see Poli (2011) and the papers collected in Kuwali and Viljoen (2014).
- 17.
See Article 4.j. According to Cadin (2010), p. 5 et seq, the faculty of AU Member States to request the intervention of the AU in order to restore the national peace and security, read together with the AU right to act in any Member State in the grave circumstances listed in Article 4.h, would entail the passage from non-interference to non-indifference as AU core principle. Similarly, see also Maluwa (2001), p. 29.
- 18.
- 19.
See Article 4.a, b and g.
- 20.
See Articles 6 and 7.
- 21.
Article 17.1 declares that ‘in the fulfilment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa’. Article 7.2 adds that ‘where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security’.
- 22.
See Kioko (2003), p. 820 et seq.
- 23.
See Levitt (2003), p. 125 et seq.
- 24.
See Paliwal (2010), p. 216 et seq.
- 25.
The literature pertaining to the problems of the relationship between the UN and the regional organisations in the field of regional security is very ample. For instance, see the authors already mentioned in note 5 and the bibliographic sources there listed. Recently, also see International Organizations Law Review (2016), issue 1, entirely dedicated to the abovementioned topic, with a particular focus on the problems of shared international responsibility between international organisations.
- 26.
- 27.
On the similarities between the PSC and the UN Security Council in the field of peace maintenance, see Cadin (2010), p. 9 et seq.
- 28.
While I am writing, 28 AU Member States have ratified the amendment Protocol to the Lomé Act. Two third of the AU Member States, namely 36, should ratify the said Protocol in order to allow its entry into force.
- 29.
While I am writing, the following AU Member States are not parties to the Durban Protocol: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of The Congo, Liberia, Seychelles, Somalia and South Sudan.
- 30.
The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government elects the 15 PSC members according to three criterions: equitable regional representation, rotation and national democracy. As for the third criterion, the election to the PSC must take account of the democratic practice within the State, its commitment to defend the AU principles and its willingness to contribute to the peace and security policies in Africa. Of course, the AU Assembly usually interprets discretionally the third criterion.
- 31.
Additionally, at least once a year, a PSC summit is organised at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and, if needed, also at the level of the Heads of State and Government.
- 32.
- 33.
The inclusion of the Panel of Wises in the African Peace and Security Architecture is an idea drawn from the Cairo Mechanism, which attributed to the OAU Secretary-General the faculty to request the service of distinguished African personalities in matters relating to regional security. See Gueuyou (2012), p. 314.
- 34.
See Fanta (2009), Gueuyou (2012), p. 320 et seq; Cellamare (2015a), p. 39 et seq. Initially, the five contingents had to be persistently ready to act on the territories of each region. Afterwards, a panel of experts elaborated a special road map in order to operationalize the African Standby Force in 2015 and some changes occurred in its objectives. The road map plans to compose the Force of five contingents but without headquarters in the five regions. The units of each contingent have to station in their Countries of origin, in order to minimise the costs. See African Union Independent Panel of Experts, Assessment of the African Standby Force and Plan of Action for Achieving Full Operational Capability by 2015, 13 October 2013. Of course, this road map would represent an obstacle for the rapid deployment of the Force in the different theatres of conflict. So far, however, the road map has yet to be realized.
- 35.
See AHG/AU/Dec. 489 (XXI). Some contingents were supplied by 12 AU Member States at the beginning of 2014, so the AU Assembly could later declare that the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises was operative: see AHG/AU/Dec. 515 (XXIII). Also see the statement of the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2014/27, of 16 December 2014, where he ‘welcomes the steps taken for the operationalization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, including trough enhanced decision-making to facilitate rapid deployment’.
- 36.
The Assembly is the supreme AU organ according to Article 6.2 of the Lomé Act. On the role of the AU Assembly in the African Peace and Security Architecture and on the obstacle that it sometimes represents for rapid interventions, see Dyani-Mhango (2012), p. 1 et seq.
- 37.
See Gueuyou (2012), p. 316 et seq.
- 38.
See Gueuyou (2012), p. 318 et seq. This Conference, organised since 1990 by several NGOs, is a sort of monitoring body, whose objective is to vest African leaders with transparency and responsibility for their action in the fields of security and development on the Continent.
- 39.
See Article 21 of the Durban Protocol.
- 40.
The data about the OAU and AU direct contributions to the Peace Fund are reported in Badmus (2015), p. 100 et seq.
- 41.
AU High-Level Panel, Audit of the African Union, 18 December 2007, point 286 at p. 102.
- 42.
In particular, Article 21.2 of the Durban Protocol deals with ‘appropriate fund raising activities’, while Article 21.3 provides that the Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa.
- 43.
See AHG/AU/Dec. 16 (II).
- 44.
ACP-EC Council of Ministers, Decision 3/2003, 11 December 2003, available at eur-lex.europa.eu and at www.africa-eu-partnership.org. Also see Tehindranzanarivelo (2012), p. 397.
- 45.
The Strategy for Africa is the EU’s global response to the challenges of getting Africa back on the track of sustainable development and of meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015. See the document entitled Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, available at www.africa-eu-partnership.org and www.consilium.europa.eu.
- 46.
See www.africa-eu-partnership.org. For more information, also see Gueuyou (2012), p. 331.
- 47.
See Adjovi (2012), p. 157.
- 48.
See the pertaining AU Commission press release at www.africa-eu-partnership.org.
- 49.
See extensively the papers collected in Smith-Windsor (2013).
- 50.
See www.peaceau.org; the list of the financial partners of the African Peace and Security Architecture is updated to November 2015. Also see Adjovi (2012), p. 154.
- 51.
Of course, the foreign States act in order to help the African populations affected by conflicts. However, it is not difficult to suppose that, at the same time, some governments pursue their own interests, which could include partnerships in the trade markets or grants over the natural resources of a particular Country after the internal pacification. For example, see Derriennic (2014), p. 157 et seq.
- 52.
On the financial programmes of the United States of America in favour of the African security system, see the Congressional Budget Justifications of the Department of State on Foreign Operations and Related Programs, available at www.state.gov; for instance, as for the fiscal year 2015, see at pages 61, 128, 174.
- 53.
See www.diplomatie.gouv.fr. Also see Le Pautremat (2012), p. 183 et seq.
- 54.
See Derriennic (2014), p. 160 et seq.
- 55.
See trainingforpeace.org.
- 56.
See www.gov.uk.
- 57.
The G8 ‘Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations’ can be read in Juma (2006), p. 464 et seq. It is also available at www.pulp.up.ac.za.
- 58.
The website www.peaceau.org lists the research and academic partners involved in the African Peace and Security Architecture. Also see Gueuyou (2012), p. 321.
- 59.
- 60.
The AU participates in the management of AFISMA through the coordination of an international financial support group, made up of non-African international organisations and single States. It also called some donors’ meetings. For a critical evaluation of the external financial dependence of AFISMA, see Cellamare (2015a), p. 52. For a study in greater depth about the operations deployed in Mali by the ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and France, see Cellamare (2013), p. 239 et seq and the further bibliographic references there contained.
- 61.
See PSC press release, Inauguration of the Headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram Terrorist Group, 26 May 2015, www.peaceau.org. For the general frame, see Cimiotta (2015), p. 415 et seq.
- 62.
On the role of the RECs in the Architecture, see Article 16.1 of the Durban Protocol; see also the Memorandum of Understandings stipulated between the AU and several RECs in 2008, available at www.peaceau.org. For a general description of the topic, see Berman and Sams (2003), p. 35 et seq, and Paliwal (2010), p. 185 et seq.
- 63.
For a complete list of the AU missions, see www.operationspaix.net.
- 64.
The international donors often suspend their financial help after they realise the ‘genetic’ difficulties of the AU missions to effectively perform their tasks. It is worth highlighting the recent EU plans to cut back its funding for Burundi’s participation in AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In fact, Burundi does not seem to work for the achievement of the mission’s objectives: its participation in AMISOM appears as a means of power for the Government of President Pierre Nkurunziza, who tries to control the national army through higher salaries. Currently, the EU pays one thousand US dollars per month to the contributing African governments for the wage of each soldier sent to Somalia. In the case of Burundi, it seems that the Government keeps two hundred US dollars per month and that the soldiers receive eight hundred US dollars each, a handsome bonus on top of their much lower regular pay. See Blair (2016).
- 65.
See Aboagye (2004), p. 9 et seq.
- 66.
The Arusha Peace Agreement, signed in 2000 between the parties to the conflict, with the mediation of South Africa, led to a ceasefire agreement in October 2002, followed by a third agreement, signed in December 2002, providing for a peacekeeping force in Burundi.
- 67.
Badmus (2015), p. 128, refers that the AU had estimated the operational budget of AMIB at around one hundred and ten million dollars for one year. Indeed, according to www.peaceau.org, at the end of the operation, AMIB total budget stood at one hundred and thirty-four million dollars.
- 68.
See Badmus (2015), p. 127 et seq.
- 69.
See Report of the UN Secretary General on Burundi, UN Doc. S/2004/210, 16 March 2004.
- 70.
See UN Security Council, resolution 1545, para. 3, 21 May 2004.
- 71.
For more information about AMIS, see unamid.unmissions.org. Also see Williams (2006), p. 168 et seq.
- 72.
See UN General Assembly, resolution 59/292, 21 April 2005.
- 73.
- 74.
See UN Security Council, resolution 1769, para. 1, 31 July 2007.
- 75.
For a critical evaluation of UNAMID, see Walter (2012), p. 1327 et seq.
- 76.
For the background of AMISOM, see amisom-au.org. Also see Ippoliti (2008), p. 673 et seq, and Williams (2013), p. 222 et seq.
- 77.
About the UN and the situation in Somalia, the literature is very extensive: see, inter alios, Pustorino (2011), p. 727 et seq.
- 78.
See UN Security Council, resolution 1863, para. 8, 16 January 2009. Badmus (2015), p. 162, underlines that donations to the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM are irregular and unreliable, leaving AMISOM in financial difficulties.
- 79.
See Düsterhöft and Gerlach (2013), p. 18 et seq. Among the single governments financially contributing to AMISOM, the website www.peaceau.org lists: China, Denmark, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. On the Italian contributions to AMISOM, see Derriennic (2014), p. 161.
- 80.
In 2008, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) had deployed the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX), entirely funded by the EU. MICOPAX handed over its authority to MISCA in December 2013. For further information on MISCA, see misca.peaceau.org. Also see Cellamare (2014), p. 35 et seq.
- 81.
See Conclusions on the Situation in the Central African Republic, EU Foreign Affairs Council, 20 January 2014, available at www.eeas.europa.eu.
- 82.
On the funding of MISCA coming from the EU, see the information provided in Cellamare (2015), p. 53.
- 83.
See misca.peaceau.org.
- 84.
For further considerations on this point, see Pergantis (2016), p. 81 et seq. This author observes that, in general, the partnerships between the AU and the UN in the field of peace maintenance are based on the practice of ‘solicited authorizations’: the AU decides on the establishment of a regional mission and then actively seeks a UN Security Council authorization.
- 85.
On the dependence of the AU operative missions on the cooperation with the UN, see again Pergantis (2016), p. 79 et seq.
- 86.
About Article 17 of the Durban Protocol, see above, para. 2.
- 87.
The point is emphasized by Tehindrazanarivelo (2013–2014), p. 65 et seq.
- 88.
- 89.
- 90.
See AU Assembly, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, at 6.
- 91.
See Ext./Ex.Cl./Dec. 2 (VII), paras 7–8.
- 92.
See UN Doc. SC/8984. Also see Gueuyou (2012), p. 331.
- 93.
See Assembly/AU/Dec. 145 (VIII), paras 20 and 30.
- 94.
See UN Doc. S/PV.5868, 16 April 2008, at 2.
- 95.
Ibidem, at 6.
- 96.
See UN Doc. S/2008/813, 31 December 2008, paras 61–70.
- 97.
See the views of the UN Secretary-General on the ‘Prodi Report’: UN Doc. S/2009/470, 18 September 2009, paras 23–43. For comments, see Tehindrazanarivelo (2013–2014), p. 76 et seq.
- 98.
Pergantis (2016), p. 81 et seq, writes that the UN takes advantage of the previous deployment of the AU operative missions: the regional missions usually do the ‘dirty job’ before the blue helmets’ intervention.
- 99.
It is worth mentioning that the AU has recently made some efforts in order to create a more predictable and efficient financing system, even in the field of operative missions: see AHG/AU/Dec. 6 (XXIV). So far, this system has yet to be implemented.
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Pascale, G. (2018). The African Security System: Between the Quest for Autonomy and the External Financial Dependence. In: Cellamare, G., Ingravallo, I. (eds) Peace Maintenance in Africa. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72293-1_2
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