Abstract
Cryptographic hash functions are commonly used as modification detection codes. The goal is to provide message integrity assurance by comparing the digest of the original message with the hash of what is thought to be the intended message. This paper generalizes this idea by applying it to general expressions instead of just digests: success of an equality test between a tainted data and a trusted one can be seen as a proof of high-integrity for the first item. Secure usage of hash functions is also studied with respect to the confidentiality of digests by extending secret-sensitive noninterference of Demange and Sands.
Work partially supported by Miur’07 Project SOFT: “Security Oriented Formal Techniques”.
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Centenaro, M., Focardi, R. (2010). Match It or Die: Proving Integrity by Equality. In: Armando, A., Lowe, G. (eds) Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security. ARSPA-WITS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6186. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16074-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16074-5_10
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