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Secure Upgrade of Hardware Security Modules in Bank Networks

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6186))

Abstract

We study the secure upgrade of critical components in wide networked systems, focussing on the case study of PIN processing Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). These tamper-resistant devices, used by banks to securely transmit and verify the PIN typed at the ATMs, have been shown to suffer from API level attacks that allow an insider to recover user PINs and, consequently, clone cards. Proposed fixes require to reduce and modify the HSM functionality by, e.g., sticking on a single format of the transmitted PIN or adding MACs for the integrity of user data. Upgrading HSMs worldwide is, of course, unaffordable. We thus propose strategies to incrementally upgrade the network so to obtain upgraded, secure subnets, while preserving the compatibility towards the legacy system. Our strategies aim at finding tradeoffs between the cost for special “guardian” HSMs used on the borderline between secure and insecure nodes, and the size of the team working in the upgrade process, representing the maximum number of nodes that can be simultaneously upgraded.

Work partially supported by Miur’07 Project SOFT: “Security Oriented Formal Techniques”.

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Focardi, R., Luccio, F.L. (2010). Secure Upgrade of Hardware Security Modules in Bank Networks. In: Armando, A., Lowe, G. (eds) Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security. ARSPA-WITS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6186. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16074-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16074-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16073-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16074-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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