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Causation in Descartes’ Les Météores and Late Renaissance Aristotelian Meteorology

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 282))

Abstract

Over 70 years ago, Étienne Gilson showed the parallels between Descartes’ Les météores and the Coimbrans’ textbook that was based on Aristotle’s Meteorology. The topics treated in Descartes’ work follow those found in the frequently-taught Jesuit textbook. They both discussed the formation of clouds, rain, rainbows and other lights in the sky, minerals and salts, and the cause of winds and earthquakes. The similarities do not end at the structure and topics treated that Gilson pointed out but extend to large portions of the treatises’ content. To be sure, differences appear, but many Aristotelian meteorological concepts are found throughout Descartes’ treatise without being changed at all or only in a minor way. Descartes’ Les météores was neither revolutionary, nor was it intended to be revolutionary.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Gilson, “Météores cartésiens et météores scolastiques,” pp. 102–137.

  2. 2.

    For example, Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy, pp. 25–28.

  3. 3.

    Garber, “Descartes and Experiment,” pp. 94–104.

  4. 4.

    See Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 370.

  5. 5.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VI, p. 239. Translation in Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, p. 268.

  6. 6.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, pp. 491f.

  7. 7.

    Principia IV 187, in Descartes, Œuvres, vol. IX, p. 309. On this point and on the possibility that portions of Les météores came from early drafts of Le monde, see Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, pp. 226f.

  8. 8.

    On Descartes and Jesuit instruction at La Flèche, see Rodis-Lewis, “Un élève du collège jésuite de La Flèche: René Descartes,” pp. 25–36; Giard, “Sur la compagnie de Jésus et ses collèges vers 1600,” pp. 199–225.

  9. 9.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 185. For a discussion of this request see: Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics, p. 26.

  10. 10.

    Armogathe argues that Descartes was familiar with observations found in Froidmont’s Meteorologica. See Armogathe, “The Rainbow: A Privileged Epistemological Model,” p. 252.

  11. 11.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 406.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., p. 408.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., p. 430. On this letter and the meaning of the word “mechanical” in Descartes and Froidmont, see Gabbey, “What was ‘Mechanical’ about ‘The Mechanical Philosophy’ Chap. XX” p. 18. The last two lines of the above translation are taken from Gabbey.

  14. 14.

    See Gideon Manning’s article (Chap. 10) in this volume for a discussion of the exchange between Froidmont and Descartes. See Daniel Garber’s contribution for a general discussion of the term “mechanical philosophy” in the seventeenth century.

  15. 15.

    Physics II 9, 200a32–b3.

  16. 16.

    Principia IV 200, in Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VIII–1, p. 323.

  17. 17.

    The authorship of Meteorology IV has been and perhaps still is questioned. I treat the book as authentic. There were extremely few doubts expressed on its authenticity before 1915. For a summary and bibliography of most germane scholarship on this question see Baffioni, Il IV libro dei “Meteorologica” di Aristotele, pp. 34–44; 386–392.

  18. 18.

    Furley, “The Mechanics of Meteorologica IV: A Prolegomenon to Biology”; Gill, “Material Necessity and Meteorology IV 12.”

  19. 19.

    Gill, “Material Necessity and Meteorology IV 12,” pp. 146–147.

  20. 20.

    390b2–14.

  21. 21.

    Furley, “The Mechanics of Meteorologica IV.” Gill and Furley are by no means the first to emphasize matter and motion in Mete. IV. For example, Federico Pendasio (ca. 1600), a professor of philosophy at Padua and Mantua, claimed that the opinion that this book treated primarily matter and motion was widespread. See his Lectiones in quartum librum meteorologicorum, f. 1r: “Principium autem hoc statuo quod apud omnes est compertissimum, librum hunc, partem esse naturalis philosophiae, tractat enim quae concernunt materiam et motum.”

  22. 22.

    Although Furley refers to Meteorology IV’s “mechanics,” I refrain from this label because Aristotle does not use machines or actual mechanisms as models or analogies. Calling this “mechanical” is anachronistic. For this precise definition of “mechanical philosophy” in antiquity, see Berryman, “Galen and the Mechanical Philosophy,” pp. 235–253.

  23. 23.

    See Book six of Lucretius’s De rerum natura and Epicurus’s Letter to Pythocles.

  24. 24.

    Meteorologica, I 1, 339a20–33, trans. by E. W. Webster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 555.

  25. 25.

    On Meteorology I–III as about inanimate homeomerous substances see Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis meteora commentaria, p. 273, 20f. For other discussions of the limits of teleology in Aristotle, see De generatione animalium, V 1, 778a29–778b7; De partibus animalium, I 1, 642a2–3.

  26. 26.

    Theophrastus, Metaphysics, IX 28–29. On the fact that meteorology was a prime example of dysteleology, see Vallance, “Theophrastus and the Study of the Intractable: Scientific Method in De lapidibus and De igne,” pp. 28f. For the view that Theophrastus’ position on the limits of teleology was common to Aristotle, see Recipi, “Limits of Teleology in Theophrastus?” pp. 182–213; but, for the view that Theophrastus was attacking Aristotle, see Lennox, “Theophrastus on the Limits of Teleology,” pp. 143–151.

  27. 27.

    See Physics II 8, 198b16–21. Whether Aristotle actually endorsed a teleological position in this case has been a matter for debate. For a discussion of this issue see Furley, “The Rainfall Example in Physics II.8,” pp. 115–120.

  28. 28.

    Meteorologica, I 1, 339a2–3.

  29. 29.

    Daiber, “The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation,” pp. 166–293, with an English trans. of treatise, pp. 261–271.

  30. 30.

    Meteorologica, I 7, 344a5–7, trans. by E. W. Webster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 562. Cynthia A. Freeland contends that Meteorology I–III relies on abduction rather than dialectics or syllogisms. See Freeland, “Scientific Explanation and Empirical Data in Aristotle’s Meteorology,” pp. 67–102. For a discussion of the lack of teleology in the Mete. See: Liba Taub, Ancient Meteorology, pp. 80–84. This lack is not always recognized, see Meinel, “Les Météores de Froidmont et les Météores de Descartes,” p. 107.

  31. 31.

    By meteorology, I limit myself to the field that considered the causes of atmospheric and subterranean events and do not consider the prognostication of weather via signs. By limiting myself to this field, I am following Aristotle’s definition of meteorology, which was understood as such by the large part of practitioners of natural philosophy in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle’s definition see Meteorologica, I 1, 338a19–339a5.

  32. 32.

    Averroes, In quartum librum meteorologicorum, in Opera, vol. IV, f. 460r.

  33. 33.

    Albertus Magnus, Liber quartus meteororum, in Opera omnia vol. IV, p. 705.

  34. 34.

    Buridan, Expositio libri meteororum, f. 103r; Blasius of Parma, Expositio in libros meteorologicorum, ff.1r; 49r. This view was followed in the sixteenth century by, among others, Agostino Nifo, Konrad Gesner, Francesco de Vieri, Agostino Pallavicini, Joannes Hawenreuter, Jacques Charpentier.

  35. 35.

    “Dicendum, scientiam de natura non esse scientiam simpliciter, qualis est scientia mathematica, est tamen scientia propter quid: quia inventio causae, quae habetur per syllogismum coniecturalem, est propter quid effectus. per haec delentur obiectiones, quae contra haec fieri solent: Prima quidem delentur ex eo, quia non est circulus in demonstratione, cum primus processus sit tantum syllogismus, secundus vero demonstratio propter quid. deletur etiam Secunda obiectio, quia effectus semper est notior ipsa causa in genere notitiae quia est. nunquam enim causa potest esse ita certa quia est, sicut effectus, cuius esse est ad sensum notum. Ipsum vero quia est causae, est coniecturale, utrum tale esse coniecturale est notius ipso effectu, in genere notitiae propter quid. nam posita inventione causae semper scitur propter quid effectus. unde & Aristo., in libro Meteororum concedit se non tradidisse veras causas effectuum naturalium, sed quo erat sibi possibile coniecturabiliter” (Nifo, Expositio super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de physico auditu, f. 6v).

  36. 36.

    “Peripatetici autem et alii stulti Philosophi qui volunt omnia scire, dicunt ex necessitate motus Coeli haec evenire” (Pomponazzi, In libros meteororum, f. 167r).

  37. 37.

    “Quoniam Aristoteles non posuit causam finalem terrae motus, Seneca autem in suis quaestionibus ponit finem, quia fiant terrae motus, et ego quia promisivo his in hoc libro dicturum de causa finali omnium effectuum, qui in his quatuor libris determinantur, ita etiam observabo. loquamur ergo de fine extrinseco, utrum terraemotus habeat utilitatem aliquam pro fine in universo propriam, et sic etiam de ventis; nulla enim res abstracta est in mundo quae non conveniat naturae ad aliquid, et propriam habeat utilitatem in universo, et in suo genere sit maxima bona: Deus enim secundum Philosophos est auctor optimus et sapientissimus, cum autem universum sit opus Dei, oportet ergo quod perfectissime hoc fecerit, ut Plato posuit in Thimeo [sic]” (Pomponazzi, In libros meteororum, f. 190v).

  38. 38.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VI, pp. 239–241.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 240.

  40. 40.

    Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, p. 155.

  41. 41.

    Collegium Conimbricense, In libros meteorologicos, pp. 4f.

  42. 42.

    Duhamel, De meteoris et fossilibus, p. 11.

  43. 43.

    Poinsot, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus: Tomus tertius philosophia naturalis, p. 129.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., pp. 129f.

  45. 45.

    Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, p. 154.

  46. 46.

    Froidmont, Libri sex meteorologicorum, p. 41.

  47. 47.

    Resta, Meteorologia de igneis aereis aqueisque corporibus, p. 795.

  48. 48.

    Eustachius, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, pp. 154f.

  49. 49.

    Froidmont, Libri sex meteorologicorum, pp. 196–198.

  50. 50.

    Resta, Meteorologia de igneis aereis aqueisque corporibus, p. 363.

  51. 51.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, pp. 402–409.

  52. 52.

    See supra, p. XX [1].

  53. 53.

    Cabeo shared his concern over the non-physical nature of substantial forms with other contemporary Jesuits, namely Honoré Fabri. See Roux, “La philosophie naturelle d’Honoré Fabri (1607–1688).”

  54. 54.

    “Supponendum igitur est tres iam communiter ab omnibus distingui scientias totales speculativas Methaphysicam, Physicam, & Mathematicam, quae dicuntur scientiae totales,” Cabeo, Commentaria in libros meteorologicorum, vol. I, p. 6.

  55. 55.

    “Omnes ergo illi effectus, qui sensu percipi possunt, & de facto sensu percipiantur horum omnium effectuum cognoscendi ratio spectabit ad Physicam, & ex complexione cognitionum harum proprietatum, & effectuum integrabitur Physica, quae tota versatur in hoc ut ostendat causas sensibiles omnium effectuum, qui sensu externo percipi possunt, & quae sic percipi non possunt non spectabunt ad Physicam,” ibid., vol. I, p. 9.

  56. 56.

    “Sed etiam hic videtur Aristoteles magis metaphysicis speculationibus assuetus, quam physicis observationibus,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 418; Commentaria IV, 79–80: “unde cum Aristoteles physicum agit, omnino antiquos sequitur, sed quia iste Philosophus maxime pollebat ingenio metaphysico, & apprime arridebat philosophari per metaphysicas abstractiones, reducendo semper res ad universalissimas, & metaphysicas rationes, ut constat in tota eius physica; imo & in tota morali, & poetica, & rhetorica ipsa; semper enim res deducit ad differentias, divisiones, & metaphysicas abstractiones” (ibid., vol. IV, pp. 79–80); “omnino Aristotel. ingenium erat ad subtilitates metaphysicas, & abstractiones: non concrescebat illa subtilitas ingenii, ut concrescunt physica,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 351.

  57. 57.

    “sed videant ne physicam reliquant philosophiam, ut chimaeras sectentur metaphysicas,” ibid., vol. I, p. 114; “illud est materia, non chimaerica, sed physica,” ibid., vol. III, p. 406.

  58. 58.

    “Sed istos libros non legunt multi peripatetici occupati in illis subtilitatibus metaphysicis,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 352.

  59. 59.

    “& sic fortasse forma substantialis, est essentia & ratio metaphysica apud Arist. Non entitas physica,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 80.

  60. 60.

    “non forma, & privatio, quorum alterum nihil est, alterum quid metaphysicum,” ibid., vol. I, p. 406.

  61. 61.

    “forma vero physica est ille, spiritus vapidus, & subtilis, ille enim est, qui dat rei unicuique determinatum esse. Ideo enim res est talis, quia tali spiritu animatur. Ab isto est vis activa, tanta, & talis; & sicuti diversitas harum rerum sublunarium provenit a diversis istis spiritus, qui rebus inditi sunt; ita diversitas facultatum, proprietatum, operationum, virtutum, ab iisdem prodit. Hic vero verus actus, haec vera forma, non metaphysica, mente concepta ratio, sed physicum principium facultatum,” ibid., vol. III, p. 4.

  62. 62.

    Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, § 439–462.

  63. 63.

    For Aristotle’s theory of mixture and combination, see: Joachim, “Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical Combination,” pp. 72–86. For early modern debates over the distinction of these terms see Lüthy, “An Aristotelian Watchdog as Avant-Garde Physicist: Julius Caesar Scaliger.”

  64. 64.

    “Haec est vera generatio physica, de quae hic Philosophi, quod nimirum partibus fixis; iterum volatiles aliae separatae adiungantur, & convenienti humore adglutinentur, & haec vera physica mixtio, & perficitur, ut constabit ex infra dicendis, concoctione illius humidi, quo partes spiritosae, cum fixis coniunguntur, & tota perfectio,” Cabeo, Commentaria in libros meteorologicorum, vol. IV, p. 84.

  65. 65.

    “Tota rerum sublunarium perfecta compositio in eo consistit, ut partes sint perfecto vinculo copulatae, & quo magis coniunctae fuerint, & minus separabiles, etiam ab efficaciori agente, diceretur certe res magis perfecta, in ratione unius, & compositi; istam autem partium compositionem, seu colligationem, dixi iam saepe fieri in humido,” ibid., p. 98.

  66. 66.

    “Dico ergo, ut saepe indicatum est, & non semel etiam fusius explicatum, rem aliquam corrumpi, nihil aliud esse, quam ex attentuatione humidi, quasi ex dissolutione vinculi separari spiritus, & partes subtiliores, a corporalibus: & crassas, & consistentes concidere, subtiles in auras abire,” ibid., vol. IV, p. 80.

  67. 67.

    “ut in corruptione nihil deperditur, sed quae erant unita dividuntur; in generatione nihil producitur, sed quae erant divisa uniuntur,” ibid.

  68. 68.

    For his view on the soul, see ibid., vol. IV, p. 82.

  69. 69.

    Christoph Lüthy, “Where Logical Necessity Becomes Visual Persuasion: Descartes’s Clear and Distinct Illustrations,” pp. 101–103; Claus Zittel, Theatrum philosophicum: Descartes und die Rolle ästhetischer Formen in der Wissenschaft, pp. 187–230.

  70. 70.

    Garber, “Descartes, the Aristotelians, and the Revolution that did not Happen in 1637,” pp. 471–486.

  71. 71.

    Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 455.

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Martin, C. (2013). Causation in Descartes’ Les Météores and Late Renaissance Aristotelian Meteorology. In: GARBER, D. (eds) The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 282. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4345-8_9

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