Abstract
In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.
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Corchón, L., Triossi, M. Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent. Soc Choice Welf 36, 179–198 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9