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Rural land development under hyperbolic discounting: a real option approach

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Abstract

This article presents a simple model of land development under uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. Land kept in rural use pays an uncertain rent, while net returns from land development are known and constant. The landowner is viewed here as a sequence of selves with time-inconsistent preferences. We solve the underlying timing game under both naïve and sophisticated beliefs about the landowner’s time-inconsistency and show that (i) land development is accelerated due to his present-bias and (ii) a higher acceleration is associated with sophistication.

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Notes

  1. Referring to exponential discounting, Strotz (1956) argues that there is “no reason why an individual should have such a special discount function” (p.172).

  2. For more discussion on self-awareness and its empirical support see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001) and Frederick et al. (2002, Section 5.1, pp. 366–368).

  3. Grenadier and Wang (2007) study the optimal exercise of an American call option on investment under hyperbolic discounting. The present study, in contrast, is dealing with the optimal exercise of an American put-like option to “disinvest”, by selling land to a developer. Note also that in our frame holding the option pays a periodic rent (associated with rural use) as a sort of dividend. On the optimal exercise of an American put-like option under time-inconsistent preferences see also Di Corato (2008) studying a forest-cutting problem and Tian (2016) studying optimal capital structure and investment decisions in the presence of a default option.

  4. Incentives may include compensations paid in order to induce land conservation (see e.g. Tegene et al. 1999; Schatzki 2003; Isik and Yang 2004), subsidies offered in order to favor the cultivation of energy crops (see e.g. Song et al. 2011; Di Corato et al. 2013) and growth controls set to limit urban sprawl (see e.g. Cunningham 2007).

  5. Note that, taking a real options perspective, the landowner can be viewed as holding an American put option, i.e. the option to develop, paying P if exercised. Otherwise, i.e. the land kept in rural use, the landowner receives R(t) as a sort of dividend.

  6. As in Salois and Moss (2011) the pay-off P results from the sales price net of any conversion costs (administrative fees, permit expenses, institutional costs or necessary infrastructure expenditures, etc.).

  7. The probability of having a new self born in the next time interval dt is equal to \(\lambda dt\). Hence, consistently, when \(\beta \rightarrow 0\) the discount rate is adjusted in order to account for the “sudden death” of the current self.

  8. The present study focuses on “consistent planning”, i.e. the agent do not choose plans that are going to be disobeyed. It does not consider the alternative possibility of selecting a “strategy of precommitment” which would require committing to a certain plan of action (see e.g Pollak 1968; Strotz 1956).

  9. The analysis in this section is consistent with the limit case where \(\beta \rightarrow 1\) in Eq. (2).

  10. This restriction is needed in order to ensure convergence. Note that if \(\rho \le \alpha \) land development would be never optimal.

  11. These results are pretty standard in the literature, see for instance Capozza and Helsley (1990) and Capozza and Li (1994).

  12. Note that \((R/R^{*})^{\gamma }=E[e^{-\rho T}]\) where T is the first hitting time for the stochastic process \(\{R\}\) to reach the barrier \(R^{*}\) (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 315–316).

  13. See Di Corato (2012).

  14. See for instance Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 207–211) and Geltner et al. (1996, Section 1, p. 24).

  15. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 4).

  16. The solution for the homogeneous part of Eq. (3.1) should have the form \(V_{h}(R)=k_{1} R^{\gamma _{1}}+k_{2}R^{\gamma _{2}}\) where \(k_{1}\) and \(k_{2}\) are constants to be determined while \(\gamma _{1}>0\) and \(\gamma _{2}<0\) are the roots of the characteristic equation \(\Lambda (\gamma )=0.\) However, as \(R\rightarrow \infty ,\) the value of the option to develop goes to zero. Thus, as \(\gamma _{1}>0,\) then \(k_{1}\) must be zero, otherwise \(\lim _{R\rightarrow \infty }V_{h}(R)=\infty .\)

  17. The solution for the homogeneous part of Eq. (A.2.1) should have the form \(V_{h}^{q}(R)=k_{1} R^{\theta _{1}}+k_{2}R^{\theta _{2}}\) where \(k_{1}\) and \(k_{2}\) are constants to be determined while \(\theta _{1}>0\) and \(\theta _{2}<0\) are the roots of the characteristic equation \(\Omega (\theta )=0\). However, as \(R\rightarrow \infty ,\) the value of the option to develop goes to zero. Thus, as \(\theta _{1}>0,\) then \(k_{1}\) must be zero, otherwise \(\lim _{R\rightarrow \infty }V_{h}^{q}(R)=\infty \).

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Acknowledgements

This paper builds on a frame developed in my Ph.D. thesis and was finalized when the author was a researcher at the Department of Economics of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala, Sweden. The usual disclaimer applies. The research leading to the results illustrated in this paper has received funding from the European Union by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme in the frame of RURAGRI ERA-NET under Grant Agreement No. 235175 TRUSTEE (ANR-13-RURA-0001-01). The author only is responsible for any omissions or deficiencies. Neither the TRUSTEE project nor any of its partner organizations, nor any organization of the European Union or European Commission are accountable for the content of this research.

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Correspondence to Luca Di Corato.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Exponential discounting

As standard, to guarantee optimality,Footnote 15 the solution of the differential Eq. (3.1) must meet the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} V(R^{*})=P, \end{aligned}$$
(A.1.1)
$$\begin{aligned} V^{\prime }(R^{*})=0. \end{aligned}$$
(A.1.2)

A candidate solution for Eq. (3.1) takes the formFootnote 16:

$$\begin{aligned} V(R)=kR^{\gamma }+R/(\rho -\alpha ), \end{aligned}$$
(A.1.3)

where k is a constant to be determined and \(\gamma \) is the negative root of the characteristic equation \(\Lambda (\gamma )=(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\gamma (\gamma -1)+\alpha \gamma -\rho =0\).

Substituting Eq. (A.1.3) into Eq. (A.1.1) and Eq. (A.1.2) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array} [c]{c} kR^{*\gamma }+R^{*}/(\rho -\alpha )=P,\\ k\gamma R^{*\gamma -1}+1/(\rho -\alpha )=0. \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

Solving this system gives k and \(R^{*}\). Plugging k into Eq. (A.1.3) yields Eq. (5).

1.2 Hyperbolic discounting

Equations (6.1) and (9.1) are technically similar. Proceed by solving first the underlying common problem and then characterising the solution according to the assumed beliefs concerning future selves’ time preferences.

The equation to be solved is:

$$\begin{aligned}&(1/2)\sigma ^{2}R^{2}V^{q\,\prime \prime }\left( R\right) +\alpha RV^{q\;\prime }\left( R\right) -(\rho +\lambda )V^{q}(R)\nonumber \\&\qquad =-\{R[1+\lambda \beta /(\rho -\alpha )]+\lambda \beta \{[P-\overline{R}^{q} /(\rho -\alpha )](R/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }\} \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.1)

where

Suppose that the particular solution for Eq. (A.2.1) takes the form \(V^{q}(R)=c_{1}R^{\gamma }+c_{2}R.\) Substituting this candidate form and its first two derivatives, \(\partial V^{q}(R)/\partial R=c_{1}\gamma R^{\gamma -1}+c_{2}\) and \(\partial ^{2}V^{q}(R)/\partial R^{2}=c_{1}\gamma (\gamma -1)R^{\gamma -2}\) into Eq. (A.2.1) yields:

$$\begin{aligned}&\{[(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\gamma \left( \gamma -1\right) +\alpha \gamma -\rho ]-\lambda \}c_{1}R^{\gamma }+\left[ \alpha -\left( \rho +\lambda \right) \right] c_{2}R\nonumber \\&\quad =-\{R[1+\lambda \beta /(\rho -\alpha )]+\lambda \beta \{[P-\overline{R}^{q} /(\rho -\alpha )](R/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }\} \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.2)

The coefficients \(c_{1}\) and \(c_{2}\) can be determined by solving the following two equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \{[(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\gamma \left( \gamma -1\right) +\alpha \gamma -\rho ]-\lambda \}c_{1}&=-\lambda \beta [P-\overline{R}^{q}/(\rho -\alpha )](1/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }\\ \left[ \alpha -\left( \rho +\lambda \right) \right] c_{2}&=-[1+\lambda \beta /(\rho -\alpha )] \end{aligned}$$

Solving both equations yields:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{1}&=\beta [P-\overline{R}^{q}/(\rho -\alpha )](1/\overline{R} ^{q})^{\gamma }\\ c_{2}&=[1+\lambda \beta /(\rho -\alpha )]/\left( \rho +\lambda -\alpha \right) =\eta /(\rho -\alpha ) \end{aligned}$$

where \(\eta =(\rho +\lambda \beta -\alpha )/(\rho +\lambda -\alpha )\le 1.\)

The general solution then takes the formFootnote 17:

$$\begin{aligned} V^{q}(R;\overline{R}^{q})=kR^{\theta }+\beta [P-\overline{R}^{q} /(\rho -\alpha )](R/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }+\eta [R/(\rho -\alpha )] \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.3)

where k is a constant to be determined and \(\theta \) is the negative root of the characteristic equation \(\Omega (\theta )=(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\theta (\theta -1)+\alpha \theta -(\rho +\lambda )=0\).

At the critical threshold value, \(g(\overline{R}^{q})\), optimality requires that the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions hold:

$$\begin{aligned}&V^{q}(R^{q};\overline{R}^{q})=P, \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.4)
$$\begin{aligned}&\left. \partial V^{q}(R;\overline{R}^{q})/\partial R\right| _{R=g(\overline{R}^{q})}=0 \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.5)

Solving the system [A.2.4A.2.5] yields:

$$\begin{aligned} k=\{P-\beta [P-\overline{R}^{q}/(\rho -\alpha )](g(\overline{R} ^{q})/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }+\eta [g(\overline{R}^{q})/(\rho -\alpha )]\}(1/g(\overline{R}^{q}))^{\theta } \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.6)

and

$$\begin{aligned}&\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-\overline{R}^{q}/(\rho -\alpha )](g(\overline{R}^{q})/\overline{R}^{q})^{\gamma }\nonumber \\&\quad +\eta [g(\overline{R}^{q})/(\rho -\alpha )]-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P=0 \end{aligned}$$
(A.2.7)

1.2.1 Naïve beliefs

Substituting \(q=n\), \(g(\overline{R}^{n})=R^{n}\) and \(\overline{R}^{n}=R^{*}\) into Eqs. (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} k=\{P-\beta [P-R^{*}/(\rho -\alpha )](R^{n}/R^{*})^{\gamma } -\eta [R^{n}/(\rho -\alpha )]\}(1/R^{n})^{\theta } \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}&\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-R^{*}/(\rho -\alpha )](R^{n} /R^{*})^{\gamma }\\&\quad +\eta [R^{n}/(\rho -\alpha )]-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P=0 \end{aligned}$$

Plugging k into Eq. (A.2.3) gives Eq. (8).

1.2.2 Sophisticated beliefs

Substituting \(q=s\) and \(\overline{R}^{n}=\widetilde{R}\) into Eqs. (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} k=\{P-\beta [P-\widetilde{R}/(\rho -\alpha )](g(\widetilde{R} )/\widetilde{R})^{\gamma }-\eta [g(\widetilde{R})/(\rho -\alpha )]\}(1/g(\widetilde{R}))^{\theta }, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}&\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-\widetilde{R}/(\rho -\alpha )](g(\widetilde{R})/\widetilde{R})^{\gamma }\\&\quad +\eta [g(\widetilde{R} )/(\rho -\alpha )]-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P=0. \end{aligned}$$

Then, imposing the stationarity condition \(g(\widetilde{R})=\widetilde{R}=R^{s}\) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} k=\{P-\beta [P-R^{s}/(\rho -\alpha )]-\eta [R^{s}/(\rho -\alpha )]\}(1/R^{s})^{\theta }, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} R^{s}=\frac{\theta +\beta (\gamma -\theta )}{\eta (\theta -1)+\beta (\gamma -\theta )}P(\rho -\alpha ). \end{aligned}$$

Plugging k into Eq. (A.2.3) gives Eq. (11).

1.3 Timing thresholds: properties

Define the function \(Z(x)=\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-R^{*}/(\rho -\alpha )](x/R^{*})^{\gamma }+\eta [x/(\rho -\alpha )]\) \(-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P\). Note that Z(x) is convex in x,\(\ Z(R^{n})=0\) and \(Z(R^{*})<0\). Optimality requires that \(Z^{\text { }\prime }(R^{n})>0\). Hence, it follows that \(R^{*}<R^{n}\). Then, as \(\theta >\gamma \), it can easily be shown that \([\gamma /(\gamma -1)]<[\theta +\beta (\gamma -\theta )]/[\eta (\theta -1)+\beta (\gamma -\theta )]<[\theta /(\theta -1)]\). This in turn implies that \(R^{*}<R^{s}<R^{**}.\)

Finally, define the function \(Z(x;\widetilde{x})=\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-\widetilde{x}/(\rho -\alpha )](x/\widetilde{x})^{\gamma }+\eta [x/(\rho -\alpha )]\) \(-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P\). Denote by \(g(\widetilde{x})\ \)the solution of the equation \(Z(g(\widetilde{x});\widetilde{x})=0.\) Totally differentiating with respect to \(\widetilde{x}\) yields:

$$\begin{aligned}&\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)]\{-1/(\rho -\alpha )\\&\quad +[P-\widetilde{x}/(\rho -\alpha )][(1/g(\widetilde{x}))\partial g(\widetilde{x})/\partial \widetilde{x}-(\gamma /\widetilde{x})]\}(g(\widetilde{x})/\widetilde{x})^{\gamma }\\&\quad +\eta (\partial g(\widetilde{x})/\partial \widetilde{x})/(\rho -\alpha )=0 \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging gives:

$$\begin{aligned}&\partial g(\widetilde{x})/\partial \widetilde{x}\\&\quad =\frac{\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)](g(\widetilde{x})/\widetilde{x})^{\gamma } \widetilde{x}(\gamma -1)}{\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P(\rho -\alpha )-\widetilde{x}](g(\widetilde{x})/\widetilde{x})^{\gamma -1} +\eta \widetilde{x}}\left( \frac{R^{*}}{\widetilde{x}}-1\right)<0\text {, for }R^{*}<\widetilde{x} \end{aligned}$$

Note that:

$$\begin{aligned} Z(R^{n};R^{*})=Z(R^{s};R^{s})=0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, as \(R^{*}<R^{s}\), it follows that \(R^{n}<R^{s}\).

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Di Corato, L. Rural land development under hyperbolic discounting: a real option approach. Lett Spat Resour Sci 11, 167–182 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-018-0209-2

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