Abstract
This article presents a simple model of land development under uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. Land kept in rural use pays an uncertain rent, while net returns from land development are known and constant. The landowner is viewed here as a sequence of selves with time-inconsistent preferences. We solve the underlying timing game under both naïve and sophisticated beliefs about the landowner’s time-inconsistency and show that (i) land development is accelerated due to his present-bias and (ii) a higher acceleration is associated with sophistication.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Referring to exponential discounting, Strotz (1956) argues that there is “no reason why an individual should have such a special discount function” (p.172).
Grenadier and Wang (2007) study the optimal exercise of an American call option on investment under hyperbolic discounting. The present study, in contrast, is dealing with the optimal exercise of an American put-like option to “disinvest”, by selling land to a developer. Note also that in our frame holding the option pays a periodic rent (associated with rural use) as a sort of dividend. On the optimal exercise of an American put-like option under time-inconsistent preferences see also Di Corato (2008) studying a forest-cutting problem and Tian (2016) studying optimal capital structure and investment decisions in the presence of a default option.
Incentives may include compensations paid in order to induce land conservation (see e.g. Tegene et al. 1999; Schatzki 2003; Isik and Yang 2004), subsidies offered in order to favor the cultivation of energy crops (see e.g. Song et al. 2011; Di Corato et al. 2013) and growth controls set to limit urban sprawl (see e.g. Cunningham 2007).
Note that, taking a real options perspective, the landowner can be viewed as holding an American put option, i.e. the option to develop, paying P if exercised. Otherwise, i.e. the land kept in rural use, the landowner receives R(t) as a sort of dividend.
As in Salois and Moss (2011) the pay-off P results from the sales price net of any conversion costs (administrative fees, permit expenses, institutional costs or necessary infrastructure expenditures, etc.).
The probability of having a new self born in the next time interval dt is equal to \(\lambda dt\). Hence, consistently, when \(\beta \rightarrow 0\) the discount rate is adjusted in order to account for the “sudden death” of the current self.
The present study focuses on “consistent planning”, i.e. the agent do not choose plans that are going to be disobeyed. It does not consider the alternative possibility of selecting a “strategy of precommitment” which would require committing to a certain plan of action (see e.g Pollak 1968; Strotz 1956).
The analysis in this section is consistent with the limit case where \(\beta \rightarrow 1\) in Eq. (2).
This restriction is needed in order to ensure convergence. Note that if \(\rho \le \alpha \) land development would be never optimal.
Note that \((R/R^{*})^{\gamma }=E[e^{-\rho T}]\) where T is the first hitting time for the stochastic process \(\{R\}\) to reach the barrier \(R^{*}\) (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 315–316).
See Di Corato (2012).
See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 4).
The solution for the homogeneous part of Eq. (3.1) should have the form \(V_{h}(R)=k_{1} R^{\gamma _{1}}+k_{2}R^{\gamma _{2}}\) where \(k_{1}\) and \(k_{2}\) are constants to be determined while \(\gamma _{1}>0\) and \(\gamma _{2}<0\) are the roots of the characteristic equation \(\Lambda (\gamma )=0.\) However, as \(R\rightarrow \infty ,\) the value of the option to develop goes to zero. Thus, as \(\gamma _{1}>0,\) then \(k_{1}\) must be zero, otherwise \(\lim _{R\rightarrow \infty }V_{h}(R)=\infty .\)
The solution for the homogeneous part of Eq. (A.2.1) should have the form \(V_{h}^{q}(R)=k_{1} R^{\theta _{1}}+k_{2}R^{\theta _{2}}\) where \(k_{1}\) and \(k_{2}\) are constants to be determined while \(\theta _{1}>0\) and \(\theta _{2}<0\) are the roots of the characteristic equation \(\Omega (\theta )=0\). However, as \(R\rightarrow \infty ,\) the value of the option to develop goes to zero. Thus, as \(\theta _{1}>0,\) then \(k_{1}\) must be zero, otherwise \(\lim _{R\rightarrow \infty }V_{h}^{q}(R)=\infty \).
References
Bulan, L., Mayer, C., Somerville, T.: Irreversible investment, real options, and competition: evidence from real estate development. J. Urban Econ. 65, 237–251 (2009)
Capozza, D., Helsley, R.W.: The stochastic city. J. Urban Econ. 28, 187–203 (1990)
Capozza, D., Li, Y.: The intensity and timing of investment: the case of land. Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 889–904 (1994)
Clot, S., Stanton, C.Y.: Present bias predicts participation in payments for environmental services: evidence from a behavioral experiment in Uganda. Ecol. Econ. 108, 162–170 (2014)
Cunningham, C.R.: House price uncertainty, timing of development, and vacant land prices: evidence for real options in Seattle. J. Urban Econ. 59, 1–31 (2005)
Cunningham, C.R.: Growth controls, real options, and land development. Rev. Econ. Stat. 89(2), 343–358 (2007)
Di Corato, L., (2008) Essays on information gathering and the use of natural resources. PhD Thesis ID 1029, University of Padova. http://paduaresearch.cab.unipd.it/1029/
Di Corato, L.: Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism. J. For. Econ. 18(3), 194–206 (2012)
Di Corato, L., Gazheli, A., Lagerkvist, C.J.: Investing in energy forestry under uncertainty. For. Policy Econ. 34, 56–64 (2013)
Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S.: Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1994)
Duflo, E., Kremer, M., Robinson, J.: Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: theory and experimental evidence from Kenya. Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 2350–2390 (2011)
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T.: Time discounting and time preference: a critical review. J. Econ. Lit. 40(2), 351–401 (2002)
Geltner, D., Riddiough, T., Stojanovic, S.: Insights on the effect of land use choice: the perpetual option on the best of two underlying assets. J. Urban Econ. 39(1), 20–50 (1996)
Grenadier, S.R., Wang, N.: Investment under uncertainty and time-inconsistent preferences. J. Finance Econ. 84, 2–39 (2007)
Harris, C., Laibson, D.: Instantaneous gratification. Q. J. Econ. 128(1), 205–248 (2013)
Hepburn, C., Duncan, S., Papachristodoulou, A.: Behavioural economics, hyperbolic discounting and environmental policy. Environ. Resour. Econ. 46, 189–206 (2010)
Ihli, H.J., Maart-Noelck, S.C., Musshoff, O.: Does timing matter? A real options experiment to farmers’ investment and disinvestment behaviours. Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 58, 430–452 (2013)
Irwin, E.G., Bockstael, N.E.: Interacting agents, spatial externalities and the evolution of residential land use patterns. J. Econ. Geogr. 2, 31–54 (2002)
Isik, M., Yang, W.: An analysis of the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility on farmer participation in the conservation reserve program. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 29(2), 242–259 (2004)
Loewenstein, G., Prelec, D.: Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence and an interpretation. Q. J. Econ. 107, 573–598 (1992)
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M.: Doing it now or later. Am. Econ. Rev. 89, 103–124 (1999a)
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M.: Incentives for procrastinators. Q. J. Econ. 114(769), 816 (1999b)
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M.: Choice and procrastination. Q. J. Econ. 116, 121–160 (2001)
Plantinga, A.J., Lubowski, R.N., Stavins, R.N.: The effects of potential land development on agricultural land prices. J. Urban Econ. 52, 561–581 (2002)
Pollak, R.A.: Consistent planning. Rev. Econ. Stud. 35(2), 201–208 (1968)
Quigg, L.: Empirical testing of real option-pricing models. J. Finance 48(2), 621–640 (1993)
Salois, M.J., Moss, C.B.: A direct test of hyperbolic discounting using market asset data. Econ. Lett. 112, 290–292 (2011)
Salois, M.J.: The effect of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on rural land conversion timing. Appl. Econ. Lett. 19, 887–890 (2012)
Sandri, S., Schade, C., Musshoff, O., Odening, M.: Holding on for too long? An experimental study on inertia in entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ disinvestment choices. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 76, 30–44 (2010)
Schatzki, T.: Options, uncertainty and sunk costs: an empirical analysis of land use change. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 46, 86–105 (2003)
Shogren, J.F.: Behavior in forest economics. J. For. Econ. 12, 233–235 (2007)
Song, F., Zhao, J., Swinton, S.M.: Switching to perennial energy crops under uncertainty and costly reversibility. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 93(3), 768–783 (2011)
Strotz, R.H.: Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Rev. Econ. Stud. 23, 165–180 (1956)
Tegene, A., Wiebe, K., Kuhn, B.: Irreversible investment under uncertainty: conservation easements and the option to develop agricultural land. J. Agric. Econ. 50(2), 203–219 (1999)
Tian, Y.: Optimal capital structure and investment decisions under time-inconsistent preferences. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 65, 83–104 (2016)
Yavas, A., Sirmans, C.F.: Real options: experimental evidence. J. Real Estate Finance Econ. 31(1), 27–52 (2005)
Acknowledgements
This paper builds on a frame developed in my Ph.D. thesis and was finalized when the author was a researcher at the Department of Economics of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala, Sweden. The usual disclaimer applies. The research leading to the results illustrated in this paper has received funding from the European Union by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme in the frame of RURAGRI ERA-NET under Grant Agreement No. 235175 TRUSTEE (ANR-13-RURA-0001-01). The author only is responsible for any omissions or deficiencies. Neither the TRUSTEE project nor any of its partner organizations, nor any organization of the European Union or European Commission are accountable for the content of this research.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Exponential discounting
As standard, to guarantee optimality,Footnote 15 the solution of the differential Eq. (3.1) must meet the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
A candidate solution for Eq. (3.1) takes the formFootnote 16:
where k is a constant to be determined and \(\gamma \) is the negative root of the characteristic equation \(\Lambda (\gamma )=(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\gamma (\gamma -1)+\alpha \gamma -\rho =0\).
Substituting Eq. (A.1.3) into Eq. (A.1.1) and Eq. (A.1.2) yields:
Solving this system gives k and \(R^{*}\). Plugging k into Eq. (A.1.3) yields Eq. (5).
1.2 Hyperbolic discounting
Equations (6.1) and (9.1) are technically similar. Proceed by solving first the underlying common problem and then characterising the solution according to the assumed beliefs concerning future selves’ time preferences.
The equation to be solved is:
where
Suppose that the particular solution for Eq. (A.2.1) takes the form \(V^{q}(R)=c_{1}R^{\gamma }+c_{2}R.\) Substituting this candidate form and its first two derivatives, \(\partial V^{q}(R)/\partial R=c_{1}\gamma R^{\gamma -1}+c_{2}\) and \(\partial ^{2}V^{q}(R)/\partial R^{2}=c_{1}\gamma (\gamma -1)R^{\gamma -2}\) into Eq. (A.2.1) yields:
The coefficients \(c_{1}\) and \(c_{2}\) can be determined by solving the following two equations:
Solving both equations yields:
where \(\eta =(\rho +\lambda \beta -\alpha )/(\rho +\lambda -\alpha )\le 1.\)
The general solution then takes the formFootnote 17:
where k is a constant to be determined and \(\theta \) is the negative root of the characteristic equation \(\Omega (\theta )=(1/2)\sigma ^{2}\theta (\theta -1)+\alpha \theta -(\rho +\lambda )=0\).
At the critical threshold value, \(g(\overline{R}^{q})\), optimality requires that the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions hold:
Solving the system [A.2.4–A.2.5] yields:
and
1.2.1 Naïve beliefs
Substituting \(q=n\), \(g(\overline{R}^{n})=R^{n}\) and \(\overline{R}^{n}=R^{*}\) into Eqs. (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) yields:
and
Plugging k into Eq. (A.2.3) gives Eq. (8).
1.2.2 Sophisticated beliefs
Substituting \(q=s\) and \(\overline{R}^{n}=\widetilde{R}\) into Eqs. (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) yields:
and
Then, imposing the stationarity condition \(g(\widetilde{R})=\widetilde{R}=R^{s}\) yields:
and
Plugging k into Eq. (A.2.3) gives Eq. (11).
1.3 Timing thresholds: properties
Define the function \(Z(x)=\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-R^{*}/(\rho -\alpha )](x/R^{*})^{\gamma }+\eta [x/(\rho -\alpha )]\) \(-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P\). Note that Z(x) is convex in x,\(\ Z(R^{n})=0\) and \(Z(R^{*})<0\). Optimality requires that \(Z^{\text { }\prime }(R^{n})>0\). Hence, it follows that \(R^{*}<R^{n}\). Then, as \(\theta >\gamma \), it can easily be shown that \([\gamma /(\gamma -1)]<[\theta +\beta (\gamma -\theta )]/[\eta (\theta -1)+\beta (\gamma -\theta )]<[\theta /(\theta -1)]\). This in turn implies that \(R^{*}<R^{s}<R^{**}.\)
Finally, define the function \(Z(x;\widetilde{x})=\beta [(\theta -\gamma )/(\theta -1)][P-\widetilde{x}/(\rho -\alpha )](x/\widetilde{x})^{\gamma }+\eta [x/(\rho -\alpha )]\) \(-[\theta /(\theta -1)]P\). Denote by \(g(\widetilde{x})\ \)the solution of the equation \(Z(g(\widetilde{x});\widetilde{x})=0.\) Totally differentiating with respect to \(\widetilde{x}\) yields:
Rearranging gives:
Note that:
Hence, as \(R^{*}<R^{s}\), it follows that \(R^{n}<R^{s}\).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Di Corato, L. Rural land development under hyperbolic discounting: a real option approach. Lett Spat Resour Sci 11, 167–182 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-018-0209-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-018-0209-2