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Common fate, game harmony and contributions to public goods: experimental evidence

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Abstract

We experimentally study the effects of common fate on voluntary contributions to linear public goods. In each period, earnings are assigned to subjects according to the outcome of a lottery. In ‘common fate’, ‘independent fate’ and ‘rival fate’ treatments, the lottery outcomes of group members are (respectively) positively correlated, stochastically independent and negatively correlated. We observe the highest contributions and strongest reciprocity under common fate. Contrary to the game harmony hypothesis, contributions are not lower under rival fate than under independent fate. Surprisingly, under rival fate, having won the lottery in one period induces higher contributions in the next period.

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Notes

  1. See Bacharach (2006) and Tan and Zizzo (2008) for surveys.

  2. Other studies test the effects of different group identification mechanisms in linear public good experiments. Among others, De Cremer and van Vugt (1999), Cookson (2000).

  3. See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of relevant results.

  4. In 4/9 of cases in which an IF player is a winner, the two other group members are losers.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Michele Bernasconi, Luigino Bruni, Benedetto Gui and Sebastian Kube for useful comments. Financial support from the PRIN projects “Analysis of the Economic Effects of Interpersonal Relationships” and “Behavioral Approach to the Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion” are gratefully acknowledged.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Padua and ISLA, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

    Luca Corazzini

  2. School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom

    Robert Sugden

Authors
  1. Luca Corazzini
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  2. Robert Sugden
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Luca Corazzini.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Instructions of the experiment

[Instructions were originally written in Italian.]

[In all treatments]

Welcome! Thanks for participating in this experiment. By following these instructions carefully you can earn an amount which will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in any way with other participants. If you have any question raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it. The following rules are the same for all participants.

1.2 General rules

The experiment consists of 25 periods. At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly and anonymously assigned to a group of three subjects.

Of the other two subjects in your group you will know neither the identity nor the earnings. Finally, the composition of your group will remain unchanged during the 25 periods of the experiment.

1.3 How to determine your earnings

In each of the 25 periods you have to decide how to allocate an endowment of 100 tokens between a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and a COLLECTIVE ACCOUNT.

Each of the two accounts generates a return which is expressed in points. In particular:

  • each token allocated by you to the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT generates a return for you of 2 points;

  • each token allocated by you or by any other of the members of your group to the GROUP ACCOUNT generates a return for you and for every other member of your group of 1 point.

[In CF]

In each period, the returns generated by the two accounts will be assigned according to the outcome of a lottery. At the end of each period, one of three lottery tickets (numbered from 1 to 3) will be assigned to your group randomly and with equal probability. Then, the computer will select the winning ticket among the three tickets, randomly and with equal probability. If your group has the winning ticket, each member of your group will receive in that period the points generated by the two accounts. Otherwise, if your group does not have the winning ticket, none of your group will receive any of the points generated by the two accounts in that period.

At the end of each period, you will be shown three screens. In the first screen, you will see how many tokens you have allocated to the two accounts, the total number of tokens allocated by the members of your group to the GROUP ACCOUNT and the number of points generated by the two accounts before playing the lottery. In the second screen, you will be shown the ticket assigned to your group. Finally, in the last screen you will be shown the outcome of the lottery and the corresponding number of points obtained in the period.

[In RF]

In each period, the returns generated by the two accounts will be assigned according to the outcome of a lottery. At the end of each period, the computer will assign randomly and with equal probability one of three tickets (numbered from 1 to 3) to each subject of your group. Then, the computer will select the winning ticket among the three tickets, randomly and with equal probability. The holder of the winning ticket will receive in that period the points generated by the two accounts. The other subjects in your group will receive none of the points generated by the two accounts in that period.

At the end of each period, you will be shown three screens. In the first screen, you will see how many tokens you have allocated to the two accounts, the total number of tokens allocated by the members of your group to the GROUP ACCOUNT and the number of points generated by the two accounts before playing the lottery. In the second screen, you will be shown the ticket assigned to you. Finally, in the last screen you will be shown the outcome of the lottery and the corresponding number of points obtained in the period.

[In IF]

In each period, the returns generated by the two accounts will be assigned according to the outcome of a lottery. At the end of each period, the computer will assign randomly and with equal probability one of three tickets (numbered from 1 to 3) to you. Then, the computer will select the winning ticket among the three tickets, randomly and with equal probability. If you hold the winning ticket, you will receive in that period the points generated by the two accounts. Otherwise, if you do not hold the winning ticket, you will not receive any of the points generated by the two accounts in that period. Your lottery is indipendent from those of the other subjects in your group. Thus, each subject in your group will participate in a lottery the outcome of which, although determined on the basis of the same rules, is indipendent from those of the lotteries of the other subjects in your group.

At the end of each period, you will be shown three screens. In the first screen, you will see how many tokens you have allocated to the two accounts, the total number of tokens allocated by the members of your group to the GROUP ACCOUNT and the number of points generated by the two accounts before playing the lottery. In the second screen, you will be shown the ticket assigned to you. Finally, in the last screen you will be shown the outcome of the lottery and the corresponding number of points obtained in the period.

[In all treatments]

At the end of the experiment, the computer will select randomly and with equal probability one of the 25 periods. The points obtained in the selected period will be converted in Euros at the rate 10 points = 1 Euro. The corresponding amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

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Corazzini, L., Sugden, R. Common fate, game harmony and contributions to public goods: experimental evidence. Int Rev Econ 58, 43–52 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-010-0111-8

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