Elsevier

Economics Letters

Volume 56, Issue 3, 14 November 1997, Pages 293-298
Economics Letters

Welfare effects of discriminatory two-parts tariffs constrained by price caps

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00190-0Get rights and content

Abstract

Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.

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