Abstract
Although recent scholarship accepts that Leibniz was familiar with De Rerum Natura, not enough attention has been devoted so far to how Leibniz actually presents, uses, criticizes, or endorses several key Lucretian doctrines. This paper offers a detailed reconstruction and assessment of Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Lucretius. Sections 1-2 bring to light the philosophical background of Leibniz’s interest in both Marchetti’s Italian version of De Rerum Natura and Polignac’s anti-Lucretian poem. Section 3 considers Leibniz’s vindication of natural finalism against Lucretius’ denial of divine providence and design. Sections 4-5 argue that Leibniz was, on the one hand, attracted by the combinatorial strand of ancient atomism and, on the other hand, repelled by Lucretius’ commitment to casualism, indeterminism, and emergentism. Rather than Lucretius’ materialism, it was his endorsement of the clinamen doctrine with its consequent violation of the principle of sufficient reason that most bothered Leibniz.
