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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter November 21, 2019

Executive Compensation and Labor Expenses

  • Stefano Colonnello ORCID logo EMAIL logo

Abstract

Using data on US public firms, I uncover a strong and positive correlation between executive compensation and labor expenses. On average, a 1 % increase in the wage bill translates into a 0.3 % raise in total executive pay. This association is driven by wages rather than by employment growth, is stronger for the incentive than for the salary component of executive compensation, and is particularly pronounced in the financial sector.

JEL Classification: G34; J31; J33

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Roberto Marfè, Konstantin Wagner, and Shuo Xia for insightful comments.

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Supplementary Material

The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2019-0258).


Published Online: 2019-11-21

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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